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Security and Privacy

Navaid processes confidential company strategy, transcripts, assessments, documents, contact data, and AI-provider traffic. Security controls are layered and must survive direct API calls, cross-tenant identifiers, retries, and provider failures.

Trust Boundaries​

BoundaryTrust rule
BrowserUntrusted; anon key is public
RLS/RPCAuthoritative for direct Supabase access
Edge Function service clientBypasses RLS; must explicitly authorize
LiveKit agentService-role host; validate room/session/speaker
Gemini/Resend/LiveKit/R2/SentryExternal processors; minimize data/secrets
Public token endpointsCapability scoped, rate-limited, non-enumerating

Authentication and Tenant Isolation​

  • Direct data requests use RLS against Auth JWT.
  • Edge Functions validate with auth.getUser.
  • Active company membership is required.
  • company_admin and company_consultant are admin-equivalent.
  • Session/document/task IDs are rebound to an authorized company.
  • Selected client company is never authority.
  • All functions deploy with gateway verification off and own auth decisions.

Database Defense​

Controls include:

  • RLS and least-privilege grants
  • pinned-search-path SECURITY DEFINER helpers
  • revoked implicit PUBLIC function execution
  • column guards for company budgets, session completion and derived profiles
  • forced user-message attribution
  • append-only history/audit paths
  • invitation domain trigger
  • claim locks for turns and summaries
  • idempotent invite consumption
  • R2 quota/key guard functions

Service-role-only tables use RLS with no client policy.

Public Capabilities​

Invitations​

Anonymous preview is get_invitation_by_token(token), not table-wide SELECT. Acceptance requires authenticated matching email.

Session shares​

High-entropy, revocable, expiring tokens return an allowlisted read-only summary. Minting requires session owner/admin access.

Signup preflight​

Responses are deliberately uniform so callers cannot learn whether an email exists or has an invitation. Buckets combine trusted IP and hashed email.

Early access​

Public registration is validated and rate-limited; it does not expose listing.

MCP​

Discovery/challenge is public; tools require OAuth bearer and tenant/role scope.

Secrets​

Never expose:

  • Supabase service role
  • Gemini key
  • LiveKit API secret
  • R2 secret
  • Resend key
  • Sentry source-map token

The service role is valid only in Edge Functions, the isolated LiveKit worker, and Node-side test/setup. It must never have a VITE_ prefix.

Application-email URLs come only from APP_URL. Client-provided hosts enable branded phishing and secret-token theft.

Browser Security Headers​

frontend/public/_headers enforces:

  • CSP
  • HSTS
  • X-Frame-Options: DENY
  • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
  • strict-origin referrer policy
  • microphone-only permissions policy
  • COOP

Referrer policy is particularly important for invite/share/OAuth tokens.

Input and Output Safety​

  • method/body/length/type validation before provider work
  • generic client 500s; detailed logs server-side
  • no raw model output trust
  • JSON/schema validation
  • grounded URL/fetch controls
  • document decompression/page/character limits
  • safe image extension/MIME/size checks
  • no model-driven eval or arbitrary DOM selector
  • sanitized/escaped email templates

Abuse and Cost Controls​

  • authenticated per-user rates
  • trusted gateway IP for public rates
  • monthly input/output budgets
  • bounded grounded fan-out
  • conservative Live usage accounting
  • R2 file/count/byte quotas
  • single-winner claims
  • idempotency ledgers

The Admin UI stores daily_token_budget and alert_config, but current main does not consume them for runtime enforcement/alerts.

Privacy and Observability​

Sentry:

  • sendDefaultPii:false
  • replay masks all text
  • replay blocks all media
  • raw production error messages are hidden from users

Do not log:

  • prompts/transcripts/documents
  • bearer, invite, share or OAuth tokens
  • presigned URLs
  • full email content

Provider payloads should include only the minimum company context required.

Account Lifecycle​

User export should include user-owned/profile/session-related data appropriate to the product. delete-account verifies self identity and uses transactional cleanup for public rows before deleting the Auth identity.

Deletion must consider:

  • ownership versus shared company records
  • audit/history actor nulling
  • invitation/referral/feedback references
  • Storage avatar
  • R2 documents governed by company ownership/retention
  • provider logs and configured retention

Security Testing​

Test at least:

  • unauthenticated
  • tenant A ordinary member
  • tenant B hostile UUID
  • manager
  • admin/consultant
  • system admin
  • removed/suspended membership
  • expired/revoked capability
  • malformed/oversized body
  • concurrent/replayed request

Run HawkScan only against local synthetic Supabase using LOCAL_DAST_RUNBOOK.md; never point the saved authenticated scan at production.

Vulnerability Response​

  1. contain access/provider key,
  2. preserve evidence without leaking data,
  3. rotate compromised secrets,
  4. fix source/migration,
  5. test exploit and regression locally,
  6. deploy through controlled path,
  7. verify logs/config/data exposure,
  8. document incident and remaining cleanup.

For service-role exposure follow docs/SECURITY_KEY_ROTATION_RUNBOOK.md.

Extension Checklist​

Before shipping:

  • actor and tenant relationship explicit
  • service-role query cannot cross tenant
  • public response non-enumerating and bounded
  • provider spend controlled/accounted
  • retry/concurrency semantics safe
  • sensitive values absent from browser/logs
  • CSP/provider data boundary reviewed
  • negative persona and DAST coverage added